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The Rule of Law or the Rule of Fear:




The recent escalation of the war on drugs in Colombia has awak-
ened the need for a more in-depth analysis of the Colombian govern-
ment's extradition practice. Little has been written on the topic, not
only because of its complexity, but also because extradition is a dan-
gerous and volatile political issue in Colombia. Many lawyers, judges,
and politicians, who were intent on sending nationals abroad to face
foreign justice, have been murdered.
Following the 1984 assassination of Justice Minister Lara Bonilla
by drug traffickers in retaliation for the Minister's tough stance
against their activities, President Belisario Betancur agreed to enforce
the extradition treaty between Colombia and the United States.I A
year later, when the Colombian Supreme Court was considering the
constitutionality of the treaty, the M-19 guerrilla organization, possi-
bly financially backed by the drug cartels, seized the Palace of Justice
* Luz E. Nagle received her law degree from the Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana in
Medellin, Colombia, and her LL.M. from the University of California, Los Angeles School of
Law. She was a district judge in Medellin prior to moving to the United States in 1986. She is
presently a candidate for the Master of Arts degree in Latin American Studies at the Univer-
sity of California, Los Angeles.
1. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Co-
lombia, Sept. 14, 1979, reprinted in I.I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, EXTRADrTON LAWS AND
TREATIES: UNITED STATES 140.3 (1985) [hereinafter Extradition Treaty]. The Extradition
Treaty was entered into force on March 4, 1982. It is not yet published in T.I.A.S. I.I. KA-
VASS & A. SPRUDZS, supra, at 140.1. The treaty was very controversial and widely criticized
in Colombia, primarily because of article 8, which permitted the extradition of Colombian
nationals to the United States. This provision was considered a violation of Colombian sover-
eignty. Despite heated debate, both houses of the Colombian legislature passed the treaty on
October 14, 1980. The treaty was then sent to President Turbay Ayala for his sanction. Ayala
was out of the country at the time and delegated the sanction to the Minister of Government,
Zea Hernandez. Acting under article 28 of the Colombian Constitution, Zea signed the treaty,
which became Law 27 of 1980, on November 3, 1980. However, the treaty could not be imme-
diately applied because the Colombian Supreme Court ruled that the Minister of Government
enacted the treaty rather than the President who, as head of foreign relations under the Consti-
tution, could not delegate those powers.
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and took the Justices hostage.2 The military stormed the palace in a
poorly planned, all-out assault. Eleven Justices and many court offi-
cials were killed and important court records concerning extradition
were destroyed.
Since that time, the Colombian government has chosen with few
exceptions not to extradite Colombian nationals to the United States.
The violence and intimidation brought to bear by the narco-terrorists
have prompted the need for a careful reevaluation of the extradition
treaty, including its legitimacy and enforceability under constitutional
and international law. In the midst of grave political and social tur-
moil, a recently elected Constituent Assembly is now redrafting the
Constitution. Although it will certainly consider extradition law, it
remains unclear whether the extradition treaty with the United States
will be enforced against major drug traffickers.
II. COLOMBIAN EXTRADITION LAW
The Colombian Constitution contains no authority supporting
the extradition of Colombians to other nations. However, extradition
provisions appear in the Colombian Penal Code3 and the Code of
Criminal Procedure. 4
A. Penal Code
The Colombian Penal Code (codigo penal) contains statutory
provisions that set forth principles of substantive criminal law. These
norms establish the elements that define crimes and criminal conduct,
the circumstances that exclude or modify punitive conduct, and regu-
lations concerning punishment and security measures.
Article 1 of the Penal Code codifies the constitutional principle,
nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege, which means that there is no
crime or punishment without an existing law.5 This article establishes
that no one can be condemned for an act that, at the time of its com-
mission, was not expressly declared punishable by statute, nor can
they be subjected to punishments or security measures that are not
2. Since the attack on November 19, 1985, the M-19 has become a legitimate and very
powerful political party, although two of the original leaders, Jaime Bateman and presidential
candidate Carlos Pizarro, have been assassinated by right-wing factions of the government.
3. CODIGO PENAL [PENAL CODE] (Colom.). It should be noted that in Colombia, a
formalistic and positivistic criteria of law prevails over realistic criteria.
4. CODIGO DE PROCEDIMIENTO PENAL [C. CRIM. PROC.] (Colom.).
5. PENAL CODE art. I (Colom.).
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articulated in the Penal Code.6 Therefore, unless extradition is ex-
pressly set forth in the Colombian laws, it cannot be used as a tool
against narcotics traffickers.
Several provisions of the Colombian Penal Code apply directly to
extradition. For example, articles 13 through 15 prescribe norms for
applying Colombian penal law for crimes committed both inside and
outside Colombian territory.7 For crimes committed within Colom-
bian borders, the law applies to attempted and completed crimes.8
Colombian penal law also pertains to those crimes initiated overseas
and completed in Colombia, as well as those initiated in Colombia
and completed overseas. 9 Colombian law regulates criminal conduct
outside Colombian territory when the following types of crimes are
committed: crimes against the existence and security of the Colom-
bian State; crimes against the constitutional regimen, social and eco-
nomic order; crimes against public health and administration; and
forgery of currency, official writings, signatures, or bills of exchange. 10
These types of crimes are punishable even where the accused has been
acquitted by the other State, or where the punishment abroad was less
severe than that established under Colombian law."
Article 9 of the old Colombian Penal Code of 1936 directly ad-
dresses extradition. It states:
Extradition shall be granted or offered in accordance with public
treaties. In the absence of treaty, the Government shall offer or
grant extradition in conformity with the proceedings prescribed in
the Code of Penal Procedure and after opinion favorable thereto by
the Supreme Court of Justice in case it is to be granted.'
2
However, this article further states that the extradition of "Colombian
citizens or of political-social wrongdoers" shall not be granted under
any circumstances. 13
6. Id.; see also OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL OF THE ARMY, CRIMINAL
LAW SYSTEM OF COLOMBIA 18 (1963) (referring to the Colombian Penal Code of 1936) [here-
inafter CRIMINAL LAW SYSTEM OF COLOMBIA].
7. PENAL CODE arts. 13-15 (Colom.).
8. Id. art. 13.
9. Id.
10. Id. art. 15.
11. Id.
12. Id. art. 9, as translated in THE COLOMBIAN PENAL CODE (P. Eder trans. 1967).
Another situation occurs where there is no extradition treaty. In this case, the government
may grant or offer the extradition according to the procedures given by the Code of Criminal
Procedure. D. CLAVIJO RosANIA & F. JAVIER GIRALDO VILLA, EXTRADICI6N Y NARCO-
TRAFico 110 (1988).
13. PENAL CODE art. 9 (Colom.).
1991] 853
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On November 3, 1980, the United States-Colombia Extradition
Treaty was approved by the Colombian government under the au-
thority of the 1936 Penal Code.14 Subsequently, the Colombian gov-
ernment enacted Decree 100, a new penal code replacing the 1936
Code.15 Article 17 of the new law, which replaced article 9 of the
1936 Code, states:
Extradition will be requested, granted or offered in accord with the
international treaties. If there are not international treaties, the
government will request, offer or grant it in conformity with the
procedures established by the code of criminal procedure. The ex-
tradition of Colombian nationals will be subjected to whatever has
been established in the international treaties. In no case will Co-
lombia offer the extradition of its nationals [without prior request].
Neither will [Colombia offer] those indicted or condemned for
political crimes.
16
This provision of the new Colombian Penal Code sets forth the
following principles of extradition: 1) The regimen of extradition in
Colombia is governed, in the first place, by whatever is established in
international treaties. When extradition is requested by a foreign
State, it will be granted according to the terms of the treaty signed
between Colombia and that State. If the treaty does not cover certain
situations, this gap will be filled by the Colombian Code of Criminal
Procedure. 17 2) If there is no extradition treaty between Colombia
and the requesting State, the extradition is ruled by Decree 50 of
1987, articles 641 through 642 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 3)
Under international treaties, Colombian nationals may be extradited
upon formal request. 4) Colombia may offer aliens for extradition
without request. 5) Colombia will not extradite individuals accused
of political crimes. This applies both to Colombian nationals and
14. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 1. Before the negotiation of the United States-
Colombia Extradition Treaty in 1979 and its approval by the Colombian government on No-
vember 3, 1980, article 9 of the 1936 Penal Code governed Colombian extradition.
In Colombia, extradition can be passive or active. It is passive when the Colombian gov-
ernment grants or offers the extradition of an individual to the requesting country. It is active
when Colombia requests or obtains a criminal from a foreign territory.
15. See PENAL CODE (Colom.).
16. Id. art. 17, which provides:
La extradicidn se solicitard, concederd u ofrecerd de acuerdo con los tratados
ptiblicos A falta de estos el gobierno solictard, ofrecerd o concederd la extradicidn
conforme a lo establecido en el Cddigo de Procedimiento Penal.
La extradicidn de colombiano se sujetard a lo previsto en tratados ptiblicos
En ningtin caso Colombia ofrecerd la extradicidn de nacionales, ni concederd la
de los sindicados o condenados por delitos pohlicos [C. C.P., 773].
17. C. CRIM. PROC. (Colom.).
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aliens present within Colombian borders. 8
One may ask whether the United States-Colombia Extradition
Treaty was negotiated by the Colombian government without consid-
ering article 9 of the old Penal Code, or whether article 17, which
allows the extradition of Colombian nationals upon request, was en-
acted to ensure the applicability of the 1979 extradition treaty. 19 In
either event, the constitutionality of extraditing Colombian nationals
to foreign nations under the authority of article 17 was immediately
challenged. On January 31, 1985, the Supreme Court declared article
17 constitutional. 20 Article 17 continues to be good law today, and
article 9 of the 1936 Penal Code is no longer enforced.
B. Code of Criminal Procedure
The Colombian Code of Criminal Procedure contains procedural
norms that apply to the substantive criminal law found in the Penal
Code.21 The Code of Criminal Procedure governs extradition only in
the absence of treaties, international conventions, international us-
ages, or customary international law.22 It sets forth a very formalistic
approach to extradition that begins with a petition for extradition of a
fugitive.
1. Petitions (Exhorto)
When an official of a requesting nation petitions the Colombian
government for collaboration in an extradition, the petition is handled
18. Id.
19. Under the Colombian legal system, laws may be modified by enacting another law on
the same subject at a later time. Accordingly, the later law (ley posterior) will prevail. When
the United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty became law in Colombia, it prevailed over
article 9, thereby allowing the extradition of Colombia nationals for the first time.
20. The Supreme Court is the third branch of the Colombian government. Article 55 of
the Colombian Constitution establishes three branches of government: legislative, executive,
and judicial. The Supreme Court is an independent branch, theoretically free of any govern-
ment interference. The 24 Supreme Court justices are appointed through a unique method
called cooptaci6n, meaning that the residing justices of the Court appoint the new justices
whenever there is a vacancy. No executive or legislative approval is required or permitted.
COLOMBIA CONST. arts. 148-49. The justices serve for a term of five years. The Supreme
Court's duty is to preserve and uphold the Constitution as the supreme law of the nation. The
Court is divided in four separate panels, each comprised of six justices. The panels are: penal,
civil, laboral, and constitutional. CRIMINAL LAW SYSTEM OF COLOMBIA, supra note 6, at 18.
The court sits as a full bench only when a case or controversy involves a constitutional
challenge.
21. C. CRIM. PROC. (Colom.).
22. Id. art. 641.
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through diplomatic channels. 23 The Ministry of Foreign Relations
sends the petition to the Superior Tribunal of the District Panel of
Criminal Decision (Tribunal Superior del Distrito, Sala de Decisidn
Penal) ("Tribunal"), which appoints and authorizes the judge or offi-
cial who will preside over the extradition proceedings. There is no
prescribed time limit for the proceeding. Rather, the proceeding
must be concluded in the "least possible" time.24 The Tribunal only
authorizes proceedings that are constitutional and within the provi-
sions of the Penal Code.25 The judge or authorized officer will grant
petition requests only if they do not violate the principles and guaran-
tees of the Colombian Constitution and laws. 26
2. Overseas Proceedings
When the extradition process requires proceedings to take place
beyond Colombian borders, a Colombian judge must send a "pleading
letter" (carta rogatoria) to a judicial authority of the country where
the proceedings are to take place. The letter is sent through the Min-
istry of Foreign Relations who forwards it to the named authority.
The judge will then directly commission the Colombian Consul or a
diplomatic agent in the respective country to perform the proceedings
according to Colombian law. The Colombian Consul and diplomatic
agents are thereby empowered to execute all judicial proceedings for
which they are commissioned. 27 When the proceedings are con-
cluded, the fugitive is returned to the requesting judge. Again, this
must be done through diplomatic channels, via the Colombian Consu-
late or the consulate of a friendly nation.
3. The Power to Offer or Grant Extradition
The Colombian Ministry of Justice has the power to offer or
grant extradition, subject to the provisions of the treaty or the Colom-
bian Penal Code.28 The government's discretion to offer or grant ex-
tradition is subject to Supreme Court review and approval
(concepto ).29
There are two basic requirements for the offer or grant of extradi-
23. Id. art. 642.
24. Id. art. 643.
25. Id. art. 644.
26. Id. art. 645.
27. Id. art. 646. These agents may not take interrogatories.
28. Id. art. 647.
29. Id. art. 648.
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tion. First, dual criminality requires that the conduct motivating the
extradition be a crime both in the requesting nation and in Colombia.
Moreover, the crime must be punishable in Colombia by no less than
four years of imprisonment.30 Second, a resolution of the accusation,
or its equivalent, must have been pronounced overseas.
3
The government may also limit the offering or granting of extra-
dition on other conditions or stipulations that it considers appropri-
ate. However, the Colombian government must adhere to the
doctrine of specialty, and demand that the requested person will not
be tried for a prior crime different from the one motivating the extra-
dition. In addition, the extradited individual must not be subjected to
sanctions different from those that Colombia would impose. If the
crime motivating the extradition is punishable by the death penalty in
the requesting State, the extradition will be allowed only on the condi-
tion that the requesting nation commute the death penalty.
32
All petitions for extradition must be accompanied by the follow-
ing documents: a copy or an authentic transcript of the sentence, if
the requested person has been convicted of a crime; a copy of the
accusation or its equivalent, if the requested person has merely been
accused; a statement of the exact place and date that the conduct
prompting the extradition petition was committed; all information
possessed by the requesting State about the requested individual that
will help Colombian officials establish the identity of the individual;
and an authentic copy of the criminal dispositions which apply to the
case. These documents should be issued in conformity with the legis-




When the Ministry of Foreign Relations receives the petition for
extradition and the required documentation, it thoroughly reviews the
case. The Ministry recommends how to proceed and whether or not
to act in conformity with any international agreements, customary
international law, or, in the absence thereof, the Code of Criminal
Procedure.
When the Ministry has made its inquiries and recommendations,
30. Id. art. 649.
31. Id.
32. Id. art. 650.
33. Id. art. 651.
1991]
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it passes the case to the Ministry of Justice which examines the docu-
mentation. 34 If the Ministry of Justice finds substantial parts absent,
the file is returned to the Ministry of Foreign Relations, accompanied
by a detailed list of the elements that are required to complete it.35
Upon completion of the ministerial review, the documents are re-
turned to the requesting State to complete the file to the satisfaction of
the Colombian government.
5. Supreme Court Procedure
When the documentation is complete, the Ministry of Justice
sends the file to the appropriate panel of the Supreme Court.36 The
Court transfers the documentation to the named extraditable or his/
her lawyer. For three days, any evidence needed for the defense is
sought. This ensures the defendant's right to formulate and present a
defense. If the Court considers it necessary, it will, ex-officio, produce
evidence for the file. A five day period for allegations follows. After
evidence has been produced and all the required proceedings have
been completed, the Supreme Court issues its opinion (concepto).
A concepto rejecting extradition is binding on the government.
However, a favorable concepto frees the government to act "according
to the convenience of the nation. ' ' 37 The Supreme Court's opinion is
not a substantive decision on the merits of the case. Rather, it merely
determines whether the documentation in the file and the extradition
procedures were in compliance with the Colombian Constitution and
laws.
The Supreme Court decision authenticates and confirms the va-
lidity of the documents presented, as established by proof that the
documents bear the necessary signatures and stamps. The Court also
determines whether the documentation "completely" identifies the in-
dividual requested for extradition, based on whether the documents
verify his or her physical description, age, weight, size, or other distin-
guishing physical characteristics.
The Court must also establish the existence of dual criminality.
This requires that the offense charged constitute a crime in both Co-
lombia and the requesting State. Generally, the criteria used in the
34. Id. art. 652.
35. Id. art. 653.
36. The Supreme Court's penal panel (Sala de Casacion Penal) reviews extradition
requests.
37. C. CRIM. PROC. art. 659 (Colom.).
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Colombian legal system for applying double criminality is in concreto,
meaning that the charged offense is explicitly described in the Colom-
bian Penal Code as criminal and punishable.
38
In addition, the Court reviews the completeness and validity of
the sentence, writ, or resolution (providencia), issued by the respective
authority of the requesting State. When the requested extradition is
based on a treaty, the Court reviews the proper compliance to the
treaty. 39 When the concepto is finished, the entire file is returned to
the Ministry of Justice. The Ministry has fifteen days to issue a reso-
lution granting or denying the extradition.
Thus, the Colombian extradition procedure is a mixed system, in
which both the executive and judicial branches play a role. The exec-
utive prepares the technical aspects of the extradition request. Then
the Supreme Court reviews the technical procedures used by the exec-
utive branch to insure compliance with the Constitution and the laws.
Finally, the President authorizes or denies the extradition, based on
his perception of what is in the best interest of the nation.40
III. INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND THE COLOMBIAN
LEGAL SYSTEM
The Colombian procedure for adopting an extradition treaty in-
volves all three branches of government, each having a defined role
under the Constitution. The President of the Republic negotiates and
signs international treaties.41 The executive branch cannot delegate
this function. The legislative branch, which consists of the Senate and
the Chamber of Representatives, has the power to approve treaties
negotiated by the President. 42 Upon approval by the legislature, the
treaty becomes the law of the land. Once a treaty is law, its constitu-
tionality and enforceability may be challenged by any Colombian citi-
38. PENAL CODE arts. 1 (legalidad del hecho punible), 3 (tipicidad) (Colom.).
39. C. CRIM. PROC. art. 659 (Colom.). Where an extradition treaty lacks specific proce-
dures for its implementation, the Court supplements the terms of the treaty with the Code of
Criminal Procedure.
40. Id. art. 657.
41. The President of the Republic, as supreme administrative authority, has the
power and duty to direct diplomatic and commercial relations with other powers or
sovereigns; to appoint diplomatic agents, receive the corresponding agents, and con-
clude treaties and conventions with foreign powers which shall be submitted to the
Congress for approval.
COLOMaIA CONST. art. 120(20).
42. Id. art. 76(22). "Congress is vested with making the laws. By means of the laws it
exercises the following functions:... to approve or reject treaties and conventions entered into
by the government with foreign powers .... " Id.
1991]
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zen before the Supreme Court.43
A. The Executive Branch
The authority to enter into extradition treaties with foreign na-
tions rests exclusively with the executive branch by virtue of its con-
stitutional power to conduct foreign relations." Negotiations are
done through a plenipotentiary, with powers to draft and sign treaties.
Article 120 of the Colombian Constitution defines the President as a
"supreme administrative authority" who is empowered to "conclude
treaties and conventions with foreign powers which [are] submitted to
Congress for approval. '
45
The Colombian government considers treaties as if they were
normal domestic bills presented to Congress by the President. These
norms have been applied to treaties by analogy. The President can
present projects of law to Congress through his Ministries, while re-
serving the right to veto the projects. The President's introduction of
a treaty to Congress is considered an exercise of the executive's power
to present projects of law to Congress."6 When a bill passes both
Houses of Congress, the President must sanction the law in accord-
ance with the Constitution. If the President ratifies the law, he must
exchange the Colombian ratification with the other country's ratifica-
tion (canje de ratificaciones). At this point, the treaty is complete and
effective.
B. The Legislative Branch
The Colombian Constitution also prescribes the functions of
Congress to create laws and to "approve or reject treaties and conven-
tions entered into by the government with foreign powers.
'47
The Constitution does not explicitly require Congress to approve
international treaties, as it does with regard to domestic legislation.
However, in reality, the procedure followed for treaties is the same as
that for all domestic legislation. When treaties are submitted by the
President, they are debated in both chambers of Congress. Each
chamber may object or approve the treaty in whole or in part.
43. Id. art. 214.
44. Id. art. 120(20).
45. Id.
46. Article 118, subsection 7 provides that the President has joint power with the Con-
gress to form laws. Id. art. 118(7).
47. Id. art. 76(22).
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Article 81 states that no bill shall become law without the follow-
ing requisites: 1) it must be officially published by Congress before it is
sent to the respective committee (Comision Permanente); 2) it must be
approved in the corresponding committee of each house on first read-
ing, by an absolute majority of votes; and 3) it must be approved in
each house on second reading, by an absolute majority of votes.
Changes or modifications can be made, but they may not change the
essence of the bill.
48
Finally, the Constitution prescribes that a bill does not become
law until it receives the sanction of the government.
After a bill has been approved by both Houses, it shall be sent to
the government, and if it also approves it, the government shall
promulgate it as law. If it does not approve it, it shall return it
with its objections to the house in which it originated.
49
The approval of a treaty by Congress is more than a legislative
act. It is an act of political control. Congress approves treaties when
it considers them convenient and useful to the political goals of the
nation.
C. The Judiciary
The Colombian Constitution states that the Supreme Court is en-
trusted with protecting the integrity of the Constitution by deciding
on the constitutionality (exequibilidad) of all the laws and decrees
promulgated by the government. 50 The Colombian Supreme Court
ruled on the constitutionality of an early treaty with the United States
in 1914.51 The Court held that it did not have jurisdiction to decide
on the constitutionality of a law that approved international treaties,
either before or after the exchange of ratifications. The Court stated
48. Id. art. 81.
49. Id. art. 85. The President may object to a bill on the basis of inconvenience or uncon-
stitutionality. However, article 86 establishes specified time limits for the President to object
to, or approve bills passed by Congress. The President has "six days, when the bill has no
more than twenty articles, ten days, when the bill has from twenty-one articles to no more than
fifty and up to twenty days, when the bill has more than fifty articles." Id. art. 86. Further-
more, the President is "bound to approve and promulgate" bills to which he does not object.
Id. Article 86 also contains a provision requiring the President to publish any bills he either
sanctioned or objected to in the "Diario oficial" within the specified time when the Congress
adjourns. Id.
50. Id. art. 214.
51. Extradition Treaty Between the United States of America and the Republic of Co-
lombia, July 19, 1914, reprinted in I.I. KAVASS & A. SPRUDZS, EXTRADITION LAWS AND
TREATIES: UNITED STATES (1985).
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that it could not determine the constitutionality of a law if the law
was challenged before the exchange of ratifications between the signa-
tory countries, because the treaty had not yet become the law of the
land. 52 If the treaty was challenged after the exchange of ratifications,
the Supreme Court could not pass on its constitutionality because it
was then the law of the land, and, as such, may require a compromise
with international law in order to uphold the treaty. Thus, the Court
declared itself absolutely incompetent to make such a decision53 and
affirmed the principle that no country can unilaterally revoke its inter-
national agreements.
In 1980, when the Supreme Court initially decided the challenge
to the approval law permitting Colombian nationals to be extradited
pursuant to the United States-Colombia Treaty, it ratified the Court's
position of absolute incompetence, as stated in the 1914 case. The
Court determined that approval laws were sui generis because they
were the product of presidential negotiations and subject to congres-
sional scrutiny. If the Court ruled upon approval law issues, it would
effectively become a negotiator of international treaties. This would
infringe upon constitutional dispositions establishing that interna-
tional treaties are to be exclusively executed by the executive and leg-
islative branches of government. Furthermore, the Court inferred
that domestic law must yield to international law, and therefore, it
could not constitutionally review international treaties. Accordingly,
the domestic laws of Colombia, including the Constitution, are subject
to the terms and conditions of international treaties.
Since 1986, when the newly formed Supreme Court assumed ju-
risdiction over approval laws, legal scholars have adopted two posi-
tions on the issue of Supreme Court competence to rule on treaties.
The first maintains that the Supreme Court is competent to hear
claims of unenforceability or unconstitutionality made against such
laws. However, the Court can only rule on flaws in the procedures by
which the treaty was enacted. It cannot decide on the constitutional-
ity of the treaty, because it is a political issue that may only be decided
by the executive and legislative branches of government. 54 Once the
treaty ratifications have been exchanged between countries, the treaty
becomes effective and the Court loses jurisdiction.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Few scholars, lawyers and politicians agree with this position. See L. CARLOS Pt-
REZ, A. HOLGUIN SARRIA & A. HOLGUIN SARRIA, 2 DOCUMENTOS DE LA ExTRADICI6N 155
(1988).
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The second position contends that the Court has no jurisdiction
over these laws at any time, regardless of whether the claims refer to
flaws in the procedure, or are made before the exchange of ratifica-
tions. The rationale for this position is that treaties are complex acts
in which the treaty and its approval law become one. They cannot be
separated for the Court to decide their constitutionality. To do so
would violate the negotiating power of the President.
The Colombian Supreme Court adopted the first position in its
June 25, 1987 decision, reaffirming its prior decision of December 12,
1986. 55
IV. THE DILEMMA OF ENFORCING THE COLOMBIA-UNITED
STATES EXTRADITION TREATY
It is important to understand how social and political factors af-
fect the application of Colombian extradition law in a country under
siege. Violence, crime, intimidation, and corruption in Colombia
have forced citizens, judges, and politicians to adopt a tenuous posi-
tion of enforcing the extradition treaty between the United States and
Colombia. Countless assassinations of judges and political officials,
including eleven Supreme Court Justices, two attorneys general, and
three presidential candidates, have prompted many officials to pres-
sure the Colombian Supreme Court to change its position on extradi-
tion and discontinue extraditing Colombian nationals.
Under these conditions, can it be said that the Colombian law
operates freely? Can the Supreme Court possibly make decisions on
extradition that are justified by analysis, logic, and conviction? Or
will personal fear and political pressure result in the breakdown of
law, rather than in its fulfillment?
Many factors point to fear as being the dominant motivation in
law-making and judicial confirmation. Many Colombians legally,
morally, and intellectually support the extradition of Colombian na-
tionals. But they are voiceless and remain silent because of fear.
No branch of the Colombian government has been more intimi-
dated than the judiciary, which, even without the constant threat of
violence, operates under enormous strain. The poorly paid judges are
the "Cinderellas" of the Colombian Justice system, laboring under
absurd workloads. "Superior" judges in any one of the major cities
have as many as 4,000 unsolved violent deaths on their dockets.
55. For a discussion of the Colombian Supreme Court decision on the extradition treaty
between the United States and Colombia, see id. at 360.
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These judges are lucky if they have firm suspects in more than ten of
those cases! In an average month, a judge may bring five to seven
cases to conviction and sentencing. Generally, these are limited to
cases with defendants already in custody. Cases without imprisoned
defendants are usually neglected, because judges are required to first
resolve cases with suspects in custody. Moreover, in the Colombian
criminal justice system, the judiciary, not the police, investigates
crimes. Judges inspect crime scenes and interrogate witnesses.
56
They may even have to type the record of the court proceedings with
a manual typewriter because no secretaries are available. It is ex-
tremely difficult to be effective under these conditions. Evidence is
often lost mysteriously by police officers who are bribed to misplace it.
Cases are shelved for years by corrupt court officials paid to keep
them from going to trial. Bringing a case to trial can take up to five
years or longer. Even when a case is heard, many witnesses will not
testify for fear of retaliation against themselves and their families.
The overwhelming majority of criminal cases have no indictment and
no trial. The judiciary is replete with inefficiency, bureaucracy, over-
work, and corruption. The few competent and honest judges feel as
though they are caught in the middle of nowhere. The Colombian
Government and the judiciary simply cannot enforce the Penal Code
effectively against the threat of the drug cartels. However, extradition
of these criminals is an alternative source of enforcement.
In 1941, the United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty of 1886
was amended, making drug offenses extraditable. However, the treaty
did not mention the extradition of Colombian nationals. In 1979, the
treaty was again amended. The new treaty clearly authorized the ex-
tradition of each country's nationals at the discretion of the executive
authority of the requested nation.57 This was a significant departure
from Colombia's prior position of exempting its own citizens from
extradition to other countries. Although there was strong opposition
to the treaty by politicians and the Colombian press, it was passed by
Congress in October 1980, and sent to President Turbay for approval.
On November 3, 1980, the Minister of Government, empowered
by presidential decree, approved the bill containing the extradition
56. Since judges are usually not provided with vehicles or protection to investigate crime
scenes, diligent inspection is often delayed or not performed.
57. See Extradition Treaty, supra note 1, art. 8. "[T]he Executive Authority of the Re-
quested State shall have the power to deliver [its Nationals] if, in its discretion it be deemed
proper to do so." Id. art. 8(1).
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treaty between the United States and Colombia.5" In mid-1981, the
President of the United States submitted the treaty to the Senate for
its "advice and consent." The treaty was approved by the United
States Senate and took effect in March 1982.59
Many Colombian lawyers first considered the extradition treaty
to be an answer to the basic necessity of fighting crime. It was consid-
ered a tool which would prevent offenders from committing crimes
with impunity by bribing and intimidating officials. But this theoreti-
cal and legalistic view of the extradition treaty changed radically as
the violence against pro-extraditionists increased in the early 1980s.
The government, namely then President Belisario Betancur, disagreed
with the Supreme Court over the United States' first request to extra-
dite Lucas Gomez Van Grieken and Emiro de Jesus Mejia under the
1979 treaty. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of extraditing the two
men. President Betancur exercised his presidential discretion and de-
nied the extradition request. He justified his decision on the basis that
Colombia had a tradition of not extraditing its own nationals. Even if
the Colombian government signed a treaty authorizing extradition of
nationals, the executive reserved the discretion to deny extradition in
any given case. In addition, the majority of nations adhere to the
principle that nationals cannot be extradited to face justice for crimes
committed in foreign countries.6° Betancur's justification was in-
tended to be a doctrine of jurisprudence. However, many scholars
believed it was political in nature and created a dangerous precedent.
Personally, I believe that President Betancur negated the extradi-
tion request solely for political reasons. He intended to inspire na-
tionalism by gaining the support of radical organizations (unions,
student groups, etc.), and by strengthening his political position as the
protector of Colombian sovereignty and independence. As a con-
servative, he was taking a big step away from the former president's
liberal political loyalties and interests. Betancur played up to the rad-
ical groups' common view that Colombia could no longer be sub-
servient to the will of the United States. The extradition treaty with
58. The bill was published as Law 27 of 1980.
59. SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE RE-
PUBLIC OF COLOMBIA, S. EXEC. REP. No. 34, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
60. To this end, Betancur argued:
It is the nature of the Colombian citizen to be judged in a preferential manner in his
country, by his judges, under its laws, his customs and language, all of which is
warranted under the constitutional principle, which has its origin in the Declaration
of the Rights of Men and Citizen, with its sources in the American Constitution.
F. RINCON, LA EXTRADICI6N PARA LEGOS Y ESPECIALISTAS 123 (1984).
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the United States symbolized that subservience. Negating extradition
became a rallying point towards reconciling numerous political fac-
tions in Colombia. By not honoring the treaty, Betancur believed he
could further Colombian independence and acquire the credibility
necessary to solve internal problems.
During this time, there was widespread acquiescence among
judges, lawyers, and citizens toward the proliferation of the Colom-
bian drug trade. Colombia's economy benefitted from the enormous
profits of narcotics sales. Many Colombian businessmen and politi-
cians profited directly from the illicit drug trade. Protectionism to-
wards the narcotics enterprises was disguised in nationalistic
sentiments, aimed at preventing the United States from interfering
with Colombia's sovereignty and control of its internal affairs.
Betancur's resolve not to be intimidated by the United States was ap-
plauded at home and abroad. Unfortunately, the growing economic
and political power of cartel-organized narco-traffickers (and the
narco-terrorism associated with them) quickly grew out of control.
Undaunted, the United States continued pressuring Colombia to
honor the extradition treaty or, at the very least, to fulfill their obliga-
tions under the treaty. Betancur continued to resist and pursued in-
stead a strategy designed to curb the escalation of drug production
and trafficking by internal enforcement within Colombian territory.
This strategy proved to be a gross miscalculation which eventually led
to disaster.
Betancur's Minister of Justice, Lara Bonilla (a member of an op-
posing political party), was a staunch supporter of extradition. He
openly denounced members of Congress who were involved in drug
trafficking and accepted bribes. 61 He stated:
Simply, the government fulfilled a treaty that is the same one that
the Supreme Court has carried forward by request of the United
States. The Court, at the same time has a term to say something
on the subject. If the concepto is favorable to the request of North
America, the government is in a capacity to accept it or negate it.
And if it is contrary to the request, the government has to subject it
to the treaty . . . if our country . . . will retract from its com-
promises which it contracted in the international fight against de-
linquency, specifically against narco-trafficking, we couldn't have
the least doubt that the consequences of the similar attitudes will
61. At this time, Pablo Escobar was a member of the National Assembly and enjoyed
close political ties with important politicians.
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be disastrous in the order of economic cooperation. This will de-
stroy the credibility of the nation not only in front of the U.S. but
in front of all the countries of the world, and the country will also
lose legal and moral authority to request extradition when the
crime is committed in a foreign country. The country has negated
reciprocity that was included in the treaty.
62
The stand Bonilla took cost him his life, for he was assassinated
by the drug cartels shortly thereafter. At Bonilla's funeral, President
Betancur declared that he would henceforth honor the extradition
treaty. Recognizing what he perceived as the popular, but silent, sup-
port for extradition, Betancur addressed the opening session of
Congress:
Even though [I was] initially reluctant to accept the extradition
treaty subscribed between Colombia and the United States, due to
my humanist and democratic convictions, and my pure sense of
national sovereignty, after the death of Lara Bonilla, I interpret the
feeling of the country by recognizing that the trafficking of narcot-
ics has no boundaries, and that those who do it should be judged
anywhere in the world where justice requests may be facilitated. 63
During the following two years, Colombia extradited approxi-
mately two dozen Colombian nationals on drug trafficking charges, in
the hope that prosecution in the United States would deter the traf-
ficking. 4 The United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty was the fo-
cus of many constitutional challenges. The Supreme Court displayed
courageous leadership in protecting the law of the land by upholding
the extraditions. Then disaster struck.
On November 19, 1985, the Palace of Justice was seized by mem-
bers of the M- 19 guerrilla movement. 65 The guerrillas killed over one
hundred people, including eleven of the twenty-four sitting Supreme
Court justices.66 All but two of the surviving justices resigned, and
62. See F. RINC6N, supra note 60, at 129.
63. See id. at 145.
64. Those extradited were mid-level traffickers. Nevertheless, their extradition made an
impact and resulted in the escalation of narco-terrorism against the Colombian state and the
general populace.
65. The M-19 guerillas are a left-wing revolutionary organization established in 1970.
The group claims to be committed to democracy and peoples' rights in Colombia.
66. The feeling I had as a judge during this crisis was one of indescribable sadness, like
being a two-year-old left without parents. I remember listening to one justice speaking over
the phone live on the radio from inside the Palace during the attack, begging the army not to
storm the palace, not to start shooting. To be a judge in a country without a Supreme Court
gave me a sensation of total abandonment and loss.
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the two remaining members had to appoint replacements to fill the
vacancies. This was no easy task, because those who were qualified
were reluctant to accept the posts.
On December 12, 1986, a new Supreme Court delivered its opin-
ion on the validity of Law 27 of 1980,67 which permitted the extradi-
tion of Colombian nationals, and declared it null and void. The
Supreme Court purportedly based its decision on the principle that
the President could not delegate his authority to conduct interna-
tional relations to the Minister of Government. It stated that interna-
tional relations is a political activity which requires presidential
prerogative as the head of state. In its opinion, the Court referred
generally to the Constitution, but did not indicate specific provisions.
In fact, there are no specific provisions in the Constitution which ex-
plicitly distinguish between the President's political and administra-
tive responsibilities. Nor are there provisions that specifically require
him to exercise those responsibilities exclusively.
I am of the opinion that the decision was neither based on consti-
tutional considerations nor on jurisprudential doctrine. Rather, it
was the result of fear and coercion stemming from recent acts of ter-
ror, and the violent attack on the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court had earlier declared Law 27 of 1980 uncon-
stitutional on the technicality that it was not signed by the President.
The new President, Virgilio Barco, tried to remedy the problem by
signing Law 27 himself. His approval of the treaty was incorporated
into Law 68 of 1986. Barco's opponents did not delay in challenging
the constitutionality of the new law. One of the challenges was based
on the grounds that since the Supreme Court had already declared
Law 27 unconstitutional, President Barco had approved a law that
did not exist.
Following the December 12, 1986, decision, the Supreme Court
became divided on the issue of extradition. Twelve justices held that
the decision taken by the Court with regard to Law 27 of 1980 invali-
dated not only the approved law, but also the treaty. The other
twelve justices held that only the approval law was invalidated and
not the treaty. They considered the approval law imperfection a pro-
cedural one which could be cured by subsequent presidential action,
such as the signature of President Barco. Furthermore, these justices
noted that there was no statute of limitation, because the Constitution
did not prescribe a time limit for presidential approval of bills. The
67. This law effectuated the treaty as the law of the land.
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conflict required the Supreme Court to appoint a temporary associate
justice to break the tie.68 Initially, no one would accept the position.
When the Court finally appointed an additional justice, he held that
Law 68 of 1986 was invalid. Thus, in June 1987, the 1979 extradition
treaty with the United States finally came to an end.
It is important to remember that throughout this period, anyone
who publicly voiced a pro-extradition opinion was kidnapped or
killed. Those whom the cartels could not buy, died. Those who sur-
vived were forced to leave the country. The drug cartels attempted to
turn public opinion against extradition by terrorizing the nation with
bombings of newspapers, public places, and businesses. The ex-
traditables, as the cartel capos took to calling themselves, claimed re-
sponsibility for much of the terrorism, and promoted their macho
slogan that they would rather have a grave in Colombia than a prison
cell in the United States. They swore to fight extradition to the death.
Although the United States-Colombia Extradition Treaty is still
in force, it is not enforceable in Colombia. The only way this situa-
tion can now be resolved is for the President to reintroduce the treaty
as a bill to the Colombian Congress for approval. It would then have
to be signed into law by the President. The only other alternative
would be to simply denounce the treaty. If this occurred, however,
Colombia would lose all credibility in the international arena. Fur-
thermore, Colombia would face almost certain economic retaliation
by the United States.
Meanwhile, the war on drugs has resulted in the continued kill-
ings of innocent Colombian citizens, caught between narco-terrorist
actions and police enforcement retaliations. For all the good inten-
tions of the present administration of President C6sar Gaviria, the
Colombian government still has no control over the situation. Fur-
thermore, many Colombian legal scholars, who once may have agreed
with the validity of the extradition treaty, have become more quiet
now than at any time in the past. In fact, it now seems that politicians
and legal scholars are looking for excuses to object to the treaty, in
order to avoid having to approve it. The untenable bases of their ob-
jections include habeas corpus, retroactivity of the criminal law, anal-
ogies to crimes which violate typification of the criminal law, and
even the semantics of the translation of the treaty into Spanish.
68. The justice was appointed only to deliver the deciding vote.
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V. CONCLUSION
Lamentably, extradition has become the only effective instru-
ment for Colombia to sanction narco-traffickers. Yet the Colombian
government is too intimidated and traumatized to use it. It is a sad
irony that Colombia is willing to extradite its nationals to the United
States to be punished for crimes they committed overseas, while the
numerous and atrocious crimes committed within its own borders go
absolutely unpunished.
If criminals know with certainty that they will be penalized,
crimes will diminish. However, Colombia must first implement an
effective judicial system. Regardless of the United States' desire for
Colombia to fulfill its extradition treaty obligations, the extradition
treaty is, and will remain, incidental to Colombian internal problems
that are completely out of control as a result of many years of deterio-
rating social order in an unequal and imbalanced society.
